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I. INTRODUCTION
Delegation and agency are ubiquitous in a democracy. How a de-
mocracy addresses these matters determines the quality of the democ-
racy and the impacts the kinds of policies implemented by the
lawmaking bodies produce. Central to these policies is the ability of
the government to generate revenue. To this end, citizens often seek
to limit their government's ability to lay and collect taxes. America's
long history is reflective of this matter, as voters have waged continu-
ous battles to keep taxes low. The earliest of these battles manifested
themselves in the structure of the Articles of Confederation, which
granted the federal government no ability to lay or collect taxes.1 In-
stead, apportionment and collection of taxes fell to the individual
states, a system that provided woefully inadequate amounts of reve-
nue. Although this was effectively remedied with the eventual adop-
tion of the Constitution, Article 1 still effectively limited tax
collections to a head tax, rather than the ability to tax other economic
entities, such as property.2 Additionally, many states have adopted
tax limitations that restrict tax collections by the state government,
local governments, or both.3
The key question is when will elected representatives faithfully fol-
low the wishes of their electors? In all republican forms of govern-
ment the first means by which the people manage their collective
agency problem is through frequent elections. In the United States,
there is also a division of power and a competitive division of purpose
among elected representatives. As Madison famously argued, "the
* Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford University.
** Professor of Political Science and Law, Duke University.
1 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII, para. 2.
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2.
3 See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XIII A, §§ 1, 3.
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great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal mo-
tives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition."'4 State governments have taken this
one step further by giving voters indirect lawmaking power through
referendum or direct lawmaking power through initiatives and, in
some cases, both. This lawmaking procedure, theoretically, allows cit-
izens to counteract their representative's ambitions with their own.
Revenue is central to the function of government. As a result, there
is incentive within the government to continually raise these levels. It
is unsurprising, then, that citizens have sought to limit the fiscal inputs
of their governments, trying to tie their hands by limiting levels of
taxation, expenditure, and debt. The earliest laws in the United States
requiring citizen approval were assessment levies, to build common
goods such as streets and water drainage systems.5 Later, in response
to frequent and widespread municipal and state bankruptcies, citizens
sought to limit public debt.6 The twin banking panics of 1837 and
1857, and the massive, reckless borrowing in the early part of the nine-
teenth century led to new constitutional debt limitations whereby a
state's voters would be directly responsible for approving new issu-
ances of public debt.7 New York, for example, adopted the "People's
Resolution" at a constitutional convention in 1846, which sought to
limit the state's ability to borrow on the full faith and credit of the
state and by regulating such borrowing to be approved by the people
via referendum.8
In the "tax revolt" of the late 1970's that continues today, voters
have sought to require voter approval, not just for debt issued on the
full faith and credit of the state, but also for the imposition of property
and income taxes.9 These were passed in reaction to an increase in
the burden of particular taxes, such as those on real property, caused
by periods of high inflation or economic downturn.10 These limita-
tions were often passed on the same ballot as other measures that
attempted to limit expenditures, or to require a balanced budget,
and in some instances to limit terms of office for state representa-
4 The Federalist No. 51, at 245 (James Madison) (Hallowell ed., 1837).
5 Vladimir Kogan & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Problem with Being Special: Demo-
cratic Values and Special Assessments, 14 Pub. Works Mgmt. & Pol'y 4, 7-8 (2009).
6 Paul Studenski & Herman E. Krooss, Financial History of the United States 132 (1st
ed. 1952).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 132 n.7.
9 See, e.g., Robert Lindsey, California Tax Revolt: Lesson for Legislators, N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1978, at B10.
10 See, e.g., id.
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tives.11 These measures often have strong interactions with tax limita-
tions, producing connected networks of procedure that have been
thought to drastically change fiscal behavior in the states.12
Yet there seems to be a set of conflicting interests that underpin the
effectiveness of these limitations. Within this set of interests, legisla-
tures have more power in this relationship because they hold the
power of implementation. Legislatures can pass budgets for and di-
rect agency action on their passed policies. Citizens have no such
means. In fact, citizens must wait for the legislatures themselves to
implement policies passed by initiative. Similarly, while short-term
oversight of implementation may be feasible for voters, long-term
oversight is extraordinarily difficult, especially when the incentives of
future agents run counter to those expressed in the past initiative.
This oversight is even more troublesome given that responsibility for
monitoring implementation is dispersed enough that "fire alarms"
need to be extremely large in order to garner a sufficient reaction. As
such, initiatives provide neither an overseer nor a veto-player to ward
off legislative action. Instead, the people, through the initiative, are
setting the fox to guard the henhouse.
We are, of course, not the first to recognize this implementation
problem. Yet, there are questions that need to be answered about tax
limitations. Do these measures succeed in limiting taxes? The answer
is: yes ... sometimes. As they are often passed simultaneously with
other fiscal initiatives, we may see the effect of tax limitations of state
spending or debt. When and where are these measures likely to be
successful? That question is harder to answer. The first is when the
metaphorical fox has incentives to successfully guard the henhouse.
This could take the form of a favorable political party holding office,
one that supports tax limitations. An example of this is the Taxpayers
Bill of Rights (TABOR) in Colorado.13 The second is when imple-
mentation of an initiative is decentralized and does not rely exclu-
sively on the legislature, as is the case with Proposition 13 in
California.14 Yet, despite these stipulations, it may be that the imple-
mentation is almost too difficult to overcome. Indeed, our results call
into question the effectiveness of both of these determinants.
11 For example, a term limits measure as well as a supermajority limitation on raising
taxes were passed on the same ballot in 1992. See Ballotpedia, Arizona Term Limits, Pro-
position 107 (1992), http://ballotpedia.org/ArizonaTerm_Limits,_Proposition-107-(1992);
Ballotpedia, Arizona Two-Thirds for Taxes Amendment, Proposition 108 (1992), http://bal
lotpedia.org/ArizonaTwo-thirdsForTaxesAmendment,_Proposition_108_(1992).
12 See Michael J. New, U.S. State Tax and Expenditure Limitations: A Comparative
Political Analysis, 10 St. Pol. & Pol'y Q. 25 (2010).
13 Colo. Const. art. X, § 20.
14 Cal. Const. art. XIII A.
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In order to answer these questions, we examine a complex of state
fiscal policies, expenditures, and debt, employing a novel research de-
sign: synthetic case control.15 This is similar to a comparable series
design. The key problem is estimating the counterfactual policy out-
comes that would have occurred had no tax limitation enacted been
enacted. The synthetic control method generates these counterfactual
fiscal outcomes and allows us to make direct comparisons between
states that have enacted tax limitations and those that have not on a
state-by-state and policy-by-policy basis. While this method provides
us with statistics power similar to a panel study, it is, in essence, a case
study method. By using a case control method rather than a panel
study, though, we are able to derive different estimates of the effects
of tax limitations that differ by state and policy, rather than restricting
ourselves to estimate a single unified effect that is assumed to be the
same for all states across all years. Using this method, we corroborate
earlier findings by Thad Kousser, Mathew McCubbins, and Kaj
Rozga,16 as well as Kousser, McCubbins, and Ellen Moule 17 that fiscal
initiatives are indeed ineffective at their stated goal of reducing taxes,
expenditures, and budgets. While frequent elections may mitigate
losses due to agency, as Madison describes, the enactment of tax limi-
tations do not share these characteristics.
Our Article is structured as follows: First we discuss the extant
literature on initiatives, discussing specifically the closely related tax
and expenditure limitations literature. Second, we discuss our method
of analysis (synthetic control) and the benefits this method provides
for our study. Third, we discuss our results, highlighting interesting
cases for explanation. Finally we conclude. Our conclusions drawn
here lead us to question the mechanisms behind some of the most
important findings in the literature on initiatives.
II. HYBRID DEMOCRACY AND TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS
There is a divide in the state politics literature about the effect of
initiatives. Some argue that initiatives provide a unique way for vot-
15 See generally Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond & Jens Hainmueller, Synthetic Con-
trol Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco
Control Program, 105 J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 493, 494-96 (2010) (explaining the use of synthetic
control methods in comparative case studies).
16 Thad Kousser, Mathew D. McCubbins & Kaj Rozga, When Does the Ballot Box
Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah, and Wash-
ington, in Fiscal Challenges: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy 290, 318
(Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Grady & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008).
17 Thad Kousser, Mathew D. McCubbins & Ellen Moule, For Whom the TEL Tolls:
Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, 8 St. Pol. & Pol'y Q.
331, 354-55 (2008).
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ers to check legislative power.'8 Elizabeth Gerber, for example,
presents initiatives as a policymaking game between voters, legisla-
tures, and initiative proponents.19 Here, initiative proposers have in-
centives to pass legislation that would move policy away from the
legislature's 20 ideal point.21 Legislatures, in turn, will pre-empt pro-
posed initiatives by passing legislation that would take its place.22
This, however, has the side effect of moving policy towards the me-
dian voter anyway.23 Initiatives then also act as agenda control mech-
anisms, forcing the legislature to vote on topical policy rather than on
policy that is nonrepresentative. 24 The mere threat of initiatives, con-
sequently, moves policy, 25 including differences in levels of spending
and taxation. 26 This, in turn, demonstrates that initiatives can mitigate
the aforementioned agency problems.
Some, however, argue that the initiative process is more symbolic
than real.27 The core of the argument is that initiatives are difficult, if
18 See Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox 37-58 (1999) [hereinafter Populist Par-
adox]; John G. Matsusaka, For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and
American Democracy 128-46 (2004); Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of
Direct Democracy in the American States, in Citizens as Legislators 1, 13-16 (Shaun
Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative
Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 99, 124 (1996) [hereinafter
Legislative Response]; Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Ap-
proaches to Old Questions, 7 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 463, 469-80 (2004); John G. Matsusaka,
Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103 J. Pol. Econ.
587, 620-21 (1995); John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First
Half of the Twentieth Century, 43 J.L. & Econ. 619, 641-42 (2000); John G. Matsusaka &
Nolan M. McCarty, Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives,
17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 413, 444-46 (2001).
19 Gerber, Legislative Response, note 18, at 101-02.
20 This need not apply only to the legislature as a whole. Many pieces of state govern-
ments can hold blocking power, from governors to extreme wings of parties. As such,
oftentimes the only way to get around this type of blocking is through the passage of
initiatives.
21 Gerber, Legislative Response, note 18, at 102.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 109.
24 Gerber, Populist Paradox, note 18, at 121.
25 Id. at 126.
26 Matsusaka & McCarty, note 18, at 444.
27 See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & D. Roderick
Kiewiet, Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy
109-10 (2001) [hereinafter Stealing]; Kousser et al., note 16, at 354; cf. Valentina A. Bali,
Implementing Popular Initiatives: What Matters for Compliance?, 65 J. Pol. 1130, 1141-42
(2003) (finding that compliance with initiatives is reliant on the implementing leadership
and continued voter support); Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters
Make Laws: How Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities, 13 Pub. Works Mgmt. &
Pol'y 39, 57-58 (2008) (arguing that referendums may have negative welfare effects); Elisa-
beth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does Government Limit
the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J.
Pol. 43, 59-60 (2004) [hereinafter Politics] (outlining conditions impacting an initiative's
degree of success in implementation).
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not impossible, for the public to implement and oversee. 28 This is es-
pecially so for limits on expenditures, budgets, and broad categories of
revenue, as money is fungible and can easily move from one account
to another while simultaneously complying with the letter of the law.29
For the logic behind this argument, consider the following: Gerber
notes that initiatives that are passed are more likely to be extreme in
nature because, if they were not, they would likely fall inside the legis-
lature's preference bounds and would have been enacted without
resorting to an initiative.30 Initiative campaigns are also expensive, 31
so the expected payoff of the passed initiative needs to outweigh the
political cost of the campaign. Building on work by Thomas Romer
and Howard Rosenthal,32 Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins
discuss that this is precisely the type of situation where agent noncom-
pliance is most likely, because the legislature is the implementing
agent and at least some decisive part is likely to be hostile to the goals
of the initiative. 33
The literature on the effects of tax and expenditure limitations, of
which our study is a part, reflects the division in the literature on ini-
tiatives. Part of the division, however, appears to arise merely from a
methodological divide. The traditional starting point for analyzing tax
and expenditure limitations is cross-state comparisons of fiscal activity
over time.34 Many of these studies start with large panels and esti-
mate the average effects of tax and expenditure limitations through
use of pooled regression models. Typically, these pooled regressions
28 See, e.g., Gerber et al., Stealing, note 27, at 109.
29 See Kousser et al., note 16, at 351-52.
30 Gerber, Populist Paradox, note 18, at 34-36; Gerber, Legislative Response, note 18, at
106-07.
31 Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum
Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in The Battle over Citizen
Lawmaking 73, 73 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001).
32 Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 Pub. Choice, no. 4 (1978).
33 D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation 26-27
(1991).
34 See Burton A. Abram & William R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional Restraints
on Government Spending, 49 Pub. Choice 101, 113 (1986); Dale Bails & Margaret A. Ties-
lau, The Impact of Fiscal Constitutions on State and Local Expenditures, 20 Cato J. 255,
261-64 (2000); Harold W. Elder, Exploring the Tax Revolt: An Analysis of the Effects of
State Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws, 20 Pub. Fin. Q. 47 (1992); Daniel Mullins &
Phillip G. Joyce, Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure:
An Empirical Assessment, Pub. Budgeting & Fin., Mar. 1996, at 75, 79; Daniel R. Mullins,
Tax Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Response of Local Government: Asymmetric
Intra-Local Fiscal Efforts, Pub. Budgeting & Fin., Dec. 2004, at 111, 119-20; Michael J.
New, Limiting Government Through Direct Democracy: The Case of State Tax and Ex-
penditure Limitations, Cato Pol'y Analysis, Dec. 13, 2001, at 1, 3-4; Ronald J. Shadbegian,
Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect the Size and Growth of State Government?,
14 Contemporary Econ. Pol'y 22 (1996).
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show moderate to strong directional effects on state finances after the
passage of a tax and expenditure limitation. For example, Harold
Elder states that "there is strong evidence of a reduction of tax growth
in states with expenditure limitations". 35 Dale Bails and Margaret
Tieslau report a reduction of $41 in per capita expenditures in states
with tax and expenditure limitations. 36 Michael New presents a more
nuanced analysis that divides tax and expenditure limitation states
based on method of its passage, finding that states where tax and ex-
penditure limitations passed by initiative saw a reduction in average
per capita expenditures by $16.29 in each year following implementa-
tion while, conversely, states where tax and expenditure limitations
were enacted by the legislature actually saw an increase in expendi-
tures.37 Meanwhile, others have argued, using similar methods, that
the effects of tax and expenditure limitations are negligible or
unobservable.38
Each large panel analysis, however, suffers from a similar method-
ological problem. First, these initiatives are not comparable across
states. Factors that will yield different legislation that will be imple-
mented in different ways include: the initiative processes for placing
initiatives on the ballot, how frequently they are on the ballot,
whether or not competing initiatives were considered, and whether or
not the state's political parties supported or opposed the initiative.
This fact violates the fundamentals of analysis of causal inference
since we cannot attribute the effects of any changes in government
spending to a single parameter estimate.39 Second, the effect of any
one initiative is muted when a pooled analysis is undertaken. It is
impossible to differentiate, in these cases, whether the parameter esti-
mates are driven by each state sharing a very similar effect on fiscal
behavior or if an exceedingly large effect in any one state is driving
the whole panel estimate towards statistical significance. This is the
main reason why we champion the use of state-by-state analysis.
We are, of course, not the only advocates of case studies in looking
at the effect of state policy. Typically, state-by-state analysis does not
show the same strong effects as large panel studies. For example,
studies by James Cox and David Lowery and Tyson King-Meadows
and Lowery perform state-by-state regression analysis for three tax
and expenditure limitation states, finding little evidence of tax and ex-
35 Elder, note 34, at 48.
36 Bails & Tieslau, note 34, at 270.
37 New, note 34, at 8.
38 Abrams & Dougan, note 34, at 112-13; Mullins & Joyce, note 34, at 95, 97.
39 Technically, we do not have a homogeneous "treatment" across our "units." Moreo-
ver, our units are vastly different and may not be comparable..
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penditure limitation success in decreasing spending.40 Dale Bails
takes the differences in mean percent change of spending and taxation
between non-tax-and-expenditure-limitation and tax-and-expendi-
ture-limitation-implemented states, finding no differences. 41 Phillip
Joyce and Daniel Mullins find only short-term declines in revenues
and expenditures in tax-and-expenditure-limitation states but these
states have tax increases that, over time, negate the short-term reduc-
tions.42 Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule perform both a large panel
difference-in-differences estimation and individual state level regres-
sions for each tax-and-expenditure-limitation state, creating a com-
posite counterfactual for each state and finding that, of those states
that have tax and expenditure limitations, only Colorado's TABOR
seems to have a non-negligible effect.43
There have been several predictions for the success of tax expendi-
ture limitations and, likewise, initiatives in general. Many of these
have to do with legal provisions in the implementation of these mea-
sures that specify targeted revenue or expenditure streams. Dean
Stansel, for example, discusses several methods by which tax and ex-
penditure limitations can be made more effective, including expanding
their provisions to cover types of local spending and nontax revenue
sources.44 New argues that limitations passed by initiative are likely
to be more stringent than ones passed by the legislature, which
predicts their success. 45 On the other hand, predictions made by two
studies indicate exactly the opposite; that tax and expenditure limita-
tions passed by initiative are less likely to be faithfully implemented
than those enacted through the usual lawmaking process.46 Kousser,
McCubbins, and Moule discuss TABOR's effectiveness, as it is the
only tax and expenditure limitation that seems to display even margi-
nal effects. TABOR is the most stringent measure according to their
analysis, as well as having generally favorable political conditions, in
40 James Cox & David Lowery, The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps, 71
Soc. Sci. Q. 492,498-506 (1990); Tyson King-Meadows & David Lowery, The Impact of the
Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps: A Research Update, Pub. Budgeting & Fin., Mar. 1996,
at 102, 103-08.
41 Dail Bails, The Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-Evaluation, 49
Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 223, 228-30 (1990).
42 Phillip G. Joyce & Daniel R. Mullins, The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and
Local Public Sectors: The Impact of Tax and Expenditures Limitations, 51 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 240, 240 (1991).
43 Kousser et al., note 17, at 336-41, 345-46.
44 Dean Stansel, Taming Leviathan: Are Tax and Spending Limits the Answer?, Cato
Pol'y Analysis, July 5, 1994, at 1, 17.
45 New, note 34, at 5-6.
46 See Gerber et al., Stealing, note 27, at 19-20; Gerber et al., Politics, note 27, at 52-54.
[Vol. 67:
WHEN ARE TAX LIMITATIONS EFFECTIVE
that the enacting parties stayed in power for most of the term during
which TABOR was in effect.47
Despite this recent scholarship on tax and expenditure limitations,
there has been very little analysis of pure tax limitations, which is the
goal of our analysis. The typical way they are discussed is in policy
pieces focusing on case studies of individual tax limitations. For ex-
ample, in a previous paper, we discussed the impacts of California's
Proposition 13. We concluded that, although there were some unsur-
prising effects of the proposition on the amount of per capita property
taxes collected, the state government was able to circumvent the limi-
tation by turning to various other revenue streams, such as charges
and fees (which, ironically, are largely pegged to real parcels). 48 We
hope to extend this sort of analysis here to other states' tax limita-
tions, as well as updating the way in which the counterfactual level of
fiscal policy is estimated, thus giving us a better, more defendable esti-
mate of the effect of various attempts to limit taxes. We now turn to a
discussion of synthetic controls.
III. METHODOLOGY
In order to analyze the effectiveness of tax limitations at reducing
taxes, expenditures, and budgets, we use the synthetic control method
introduced by Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmuel-
ler.49 As just discussed, the heterogeneous nature of the writing and
implementation of tax limitations poses a methodological problem.
Large panel regression, in particular difference-in-differences (DiD)
estimation, both perform poorly because of this heterogeneity, as
these types of panel regressions require homogeneous effects, to-
gether with identical units or nearly so, to tease out causal effects.
Conversely, single state case studies are troublesome due to lack of
clear counterfactuals. For example, using structural break analysis as
in Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule, effectively compares each state to
its own past behavior. 50 While this is generally closer and the issues of
heterogeneity in tax limitations and states are dissipated, the synthetic
control method affords us the opportunity to estimate the effect size
of a given law.
The method, in short, constructs a synthetic counterfactual for each
tax limitation state using a weighted match of comparable states that
47 Kousser et al., note 17, at 352-54.
48 Colin H. McCubbins & Mathew D. McCubbins, Proposition 13 and the California
Fiscal Shell Game, Cal. J. Pol. Pol'y, Feb. 2010, at 1, 22.
49 Abadie et al., note 15, at 494-97 (discussing the specifications of the Synthetic Control
Estimator and its properties).
50 See Kousser et al., note 17, at 348-51.
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never enacted a tax limitation. These comparable states make up the
"donor pool." The synthetic state is generated with the goal of mini-
mizing the average distance between the composite created by the do-
nor pool and the tax limitation state prior to the implementation of
the measure. We then observe and compare the trajectory of both the
tax limitation state and its synthetic control, constructing weights on
the donor units so that the synthetic control and the tax limitation
state are similar.51 That is, we compare the direction and size of the
difference between the synthetic control state and the tax limitation
state to determine the effect of the tax limitation itself.
The synthetic control itself is sensitive to the quality of the pre-im-
plementation match. By assumption, the average distance between
the synthetic control and the TL state should be zero. The worse the
match is pre-implementation, the harder it is to make inferences about
the effects of the measure. This is analogous to a DiD scenario where
the pretest differences are always zero. Theoretically, if these pre-im-
plementation differences are zero, then all unexplained variation in
covariates across both time and space is perfectly captured by the
model. This, can be vetted through pretest matching and proper do-
nor pool construction.52 Also, the state being analyzed must be rela-
tively comparable to states in the donor pool; otherwise the weights
being proffered in the analysis are biased. Thus, again, attention
needs to be paid to the specific construction of the donor pool.
TLs are passed through a variety of means. Some are driven by
legislative fiat through referenda, some are passed by initiatives, and
others are derived and voted on at constitutional conventions, as
shown in Table 1 below. If all TELs were passed in a similar manner,
then the counterfactual would be easily attainable. For example, had
all TELs been passed in initiative states, it would be prudent to start
with a donor pool of only initiative states, since that would be the
applicable counterfactual. Because of the heterogeneous nature of
how TELs are passed, we instead use a donor pool where the defining
feature is the absence of a TEL, regardless of their other institutional
structure.
As an inferential procedure, Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
recommend the use of "placebo tests." Placebo tests are exactly anal-
ogous to, and make the same assumptions as, classical Fisher
randomization inference. 53 This method is useful for generating infer-
51 The method uses actual observed values of a tax limitation ("treated") state and com-
pares them directly to the values of a synthetic ("nontreated") state. This comparison
provides the baseline for any estimators generated by the synthetic control analysis.
52 Abadie et al., note 15, at 500.
53 See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization Inference with Natural
Experiments: An Analysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election, 101
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ences on otherwise small samples that lack traditional statistical
power,54 which makes this method attractive for analyzing state polit-
ics and policy. To perform this style of inference, we iteratively apply
the synthetic control method to each state in the donor pool, which, in
turn, generates a synthetic control case for each non-tax-limitation
state in the donor pool as if it had a tax limitation applied to it. We
then take the difference between each placebo state and its con-
structed control. These differences are assumed to be random: They
could not conceivably be driven by the tax limitation implementation
given their status as donor pool states so the likely explanation is that
any difference displayed is due to exogenous economic, political, his-
torical, or demographic factors. These differences are compared to
the difference generated by comparing the actual tax-limitation state
to its comparable synthetic control. This creates a distribution of dif-
ferences that are then rank ordered to generate an exact p-value. 55
TABLE 1
TAx LIMITATIONS
Year Method of
State Adopted Type of Limit Enactment56
Arizona 1980 Property Tax Mixed
California 1978 Property Tax Direct Initiative
Colorado 1992 General Revenue Direct Initiative
Florida 1995 Property Tax Convention
Idaho 1978 Property Tax Mixed
Massachusetts 1980 Property Tax, Direct Initiative
1986 General Revenue
Michigan 1978 General Revenue Direct Initiative
Missouri 1980 General Revenue Direct Initiative
1996
Nevada 1978 Property Tax Legislative
Oregon 1978 Property Tax Direct Initiative
1991
1996
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 888, 890-93 (2006) (discussing and giving examples of randomization infer-
ence in a social science context).
54 Id. at 497.
55 These exact p-values are exactly the same as the p-values generated by Fisher
randomization inference. See generally D.R. Cox & N. Reid, A Theory of the Design of
Experiments (2000).
56 We discuss four methods of enactment: (1) direct initiative, which indicates a
measure drafted by voters that is then passed by a popular vote, (2) an indirect initiative,
which indicates a measure drafted by the legislature that is then passed by a popular vote,
(3) mixed, which indicates a measure that is an amalgam of both methods, (4) legislative,
which indicates a legislatively-passed tax limitation or convention, which indicates that the
measure is a constitutional amendment ratified by voters at a called constitutional
convention.
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In order to better understand the effects of these tax limitations, we
analyze their effects on three separate fiscal components: (1) total
state and local own tax revenue, (2) total state and local expenditure,
and (3) total state and local property taxes. Data used for this analysis
runs from 1969-2000 and was collected from the Census Bureau's Sur-
vey of State and Local Government Finances. 57 We balance on sev-
eral covariates: lags of the dependent variable, population, per capita
real income, and dummy variables for party control of each chamber
of the state legislature and the governorship.
It is important to understand that tax limitations are all rate limita-
tions rather than general fund limitations. Even if a state government
is collecting taxes under the maximum level allowable under the
budget constraint, a rate increase should see a reduction of taxes if no
new taxes are created and there are no increases in population or in-
come. Thus, controlling for total population and per capita income,
we can infer that, ceteris paribus, we should not see an increase in tax
collections. Therefore, our hypotheses are as follows:
HI: The passage of a tax limitations will, ceteris paribus, lead to
a reduction in real total tax revenue per capita collected by the
state.
H2: The passage of, specifically, a property tax limitation will,
ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction in real property tax revenue per
capita collected by the state.58
Hi and H2 should be fairly straightforward: These are primary ef-
fects of the imposed limitations. If we are to analyze the effectiveness
of any tax limiting measure, it should first be effective at its stated
goal of limiting taxes.
H3: The passage of, specifically, a property tax limitation will,
ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction in real total tax revenue per
capita collected by the state.
Although not as explicitly straightforward, the secondary effect de-
scribed in H3 should also be true. Many state governments collect
property taxes as one of their primary sources of revenue. A reduc-
57 U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of State and Local Government Finances, http://www.cen
sus.gov/govs/local/. Data, lab note and instruction, do-files, and detailed logged output are
available at www.mccubbins.us or http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mccubbins.
58 Although we consider property tax limitations to be tax limitations in general, it is
important to highlight their specific differences for analysis of primary and secondary ef-
fects since the logic underlying specific limitations is slightly different than the logic under-
lying general limitations.
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tion in this revenue stream, thus, should lead to a reduction in the
amount of tax revenue collected.
H4: The passage of a TL will, ceteris paribus, lead to a reduc-
tion in real property tax revenue per capita collected by the state.
This is even less explicit than H3. The logic for the secondary effect
of H4 is more circuitous but is based on the aforementioned fact that
property tax is, often, the primary source of revenue collected by state
governments. As such, a limitation in total tax collections would
likely have ramifications for the amount of property taxes collected.
H5: The passage of any tax limitation (general or property spe-
cific) will, ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction in real expenditure
per capita by the state.
H5 is what would be considered a tertiary effect of a tax limitation.
All else equal, when revenue in a state decreases, the ability of the
government to spend likewise should decrease.
To explore these hypotheses, in the next Part we present results
from the synthetic control analysis. In doing so, we present the statis-
tical results and then individually discuss some interesting cases.
IV. RESULTS
The results of the synthetic control analysis are presented in Table 2
below. The results displayed include several important features:
" State name and fiscal component being analyzed: There are three
components of interest: (1) total tax revenue, (2) expenditures,
and (3) property taxes.
" Direction: This indicates the general trajectory of each fiscal
component post-implementation of a tax limitation.
" MSPE ratio: This is the ratio of mean squared prediction error,
calculated by taking the post-implementation prediction error
and dividing it by the pre-implementation prediction error. In
general, the higher this ratio is, the larger difference there is be-
tween the post-implementation state and its synthetic control.
This typically will generate a higher p-value.
" Fischer exact p-value: This is calculated by rank ordering the
MSPE ratios for the limitation state and all of the placebo states.
A lower p-value indicates a higher likelihood of the result being a
statistically unlikely result. This would indicate that we would be
able to reject the null hypothesis that a tax limitation had no ef-
fect on the analyzed fiscal component.
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It is notable after looking at the results that only two out of the
forty-two analyzed show any significance at the traditional 0.05 level.
If we relax this to include the nontraditional 0.1 level, only three addi-
tional cases appear to be significant. Of these five, one actually shows
a significant positive effect, so we can conclude that only four of the
forty-two cases show any significant reduction in taxes, expenditures,
or budgets.
TABLE 2
SYNTHETIC CONTROL RESULTS
Fiscal
State Component Direction MSPE
Arizona Tax Revenue Negative 10.3
Expenditure Negative 10.3
Property Tax Negative 16.5
California Tax Revenue Negative 24.6
Expenditure Negative 30.4
Property Tax Negative 10.3
Colorado Tax Revenue Negative 1.6
Expenditure Negative 1.5
Property Tax Negative 0.1
Florida Tax Revenue Positive 0.4
Expenditure Positive 0.8
Property Tax Positive 2.8
Idaho Tax Revenue Negative 174.2
Expenditure Negative 37.3
Property Tax Negative 16.5
Massachusetts Tax Revenue Negative 10.8
(1980) Expenditure Negative 8.2
Property Tax Negative 4.1
Massachusetts Tax Revenue Positive 2.4
(1986) Expenditure Positive 3.6
Property Tax Negative 3.5
Michigan Tax Revenue Negative 55.9
Expenditure Negative 5.7
Property Tax Negative 255.6
Missouri Tax Revenue Negative 1.3
(1980) Expenditure Negative 3.8
Property Tax Negative 27.2
Missouri Tax Revenue Positive 2.1
(1996) Expenditure Negative 0.2,
Property Tax Negative 0.9
Nevada Tax Revenue Negative 56.1,
Expenditure Negative 56.9
Property Tax Negative 208.8
Oregon Tax Revenue Negative 92.1
(1978) Expenditure Positive 7.3
Property Tax Negative 33.0
Oregon Tax Revenue Negative 0.2
(1991) Expenditure Positive 9.7
Property Tax Negative 68.8
Oregon Tax Revenue Negative 0.3
(1996) Expenditure Positive 7.1
Property Tax Negative 10.9
Ratio
05
04
87
89
98
68
09
19
52
32
24
36
84
34
18
52
83
56
91
36
73
57
96
68
58
36
88
33
43
93
45
77
41
76
97
54
28
43
97
30
9
63
Fischer Exact
P-Value
0.23
0.1
0.47
0.33
0.29
0.71
0.33
0.71
1
0.76
0.76
0.52
0.05*
0.29
0.62
0.29
0.57
0.90
0.43
0.57
0.86
0.19
0.81
0.14
1.00
0.86
0.43
0.29
0.76
0.86
0.19
0.29
0.14
0.19
0.71
0.33
0.86
0.14
0.1
0.71
0.10
0.05*
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We turn now to some of the more interesting results from the table.
Here, we first analyze two of the typical examples for successful tax
limitations: TABOR from Colorado and Proposition 13 from Califor-
nia. We then discuss some of the statistically significant results. 59
A. Colorado: Taxpayer's Bill of Rights
Colorado's 1992 Taxpayer's Bill of Rights has been examined time
and again for its apparent strictness. TABOR has the following provi-
sions: (1) Growth in total own-source revenues and spending in Colo-
rado are tied to the sum of percent population growth and percent
increase in inflation. 60 The intention was to limit inflation-adjusted
per capita revenue and spending. Collections of revenue over this
limit were to be reimbursed to taxpayers. (2) Increases in tax rates or
outright new taxes require voter approval. 61
TABOR, however sought to be much more stringent a measure.
Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule describe what we would expect from
TABOR:
[Colorado's TABOR] initiative has many of the characteris-
tics that prior research would suggest are necessary to ensure
its success. This constitutional amendment limits all taxes
and revenues at the state and local level and requires voter
approval for any tax increases or to change TABOR itself.
These provisions mean that TABOR is quite strict in the let-
ter of its law.62
In an epilogue to the TABOR story, the authors note that by 2005,
the "anticipated cuts under TABOR were so severe that Colorado's
Republican Governor Bill Owens... backed a drive to call a five-year
'Timeout for TABOR'. ' '63 Thus, the success of the initiative was its
own undoing, so to speak. The government, almost ironically, backed
an initiative, Proposition C, that was voted on to suspend TABOR.64
To this end, Figure 1 below shows expenditures in Colorado in com-
parison to its synthetic control.
59 Although one of Oregon's measures is reported as statistically significant, there does
not appear to be enough data post-implementation in either case to warrant discussion as
there is simply not enough data to make judgments. Figures for these measures (as well as
all other nonsignificant measures), both for synthetic control comparison and the placebo
tests are posted in the online appendix.
60 Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, cl. 7-8.
61 Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, cl. 3.
62 Kousser et al., note 17, at 352.
63 Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
64 Id. at 354.
2014]
[Vol. 67:TAX LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 165
Total Expenditures
Colorado vs. Synthetic Control
1970 19 0 1990 200
I - Colorado .- - Synthetic Control I
There are several things to note about this figure. First, there ap-
pears to be a deviation between Colorado and its synthetic control
starting in 1979, long before the implementation of the TABOR
amendment. Total state and local expenditures in Colorado remain
lower than the constructed synthetic control for the entire period from
1979 to 1992. This difference remains nearly constant for the post-tax-
limitation period. Second, because this difference does not seem to
increase over time, it is difficult to conclude that TABOR had a signif-
icant effect on Colorado's expenditures. Indeed, the placebo test
analysis, shown in Figure 2 below, corroborates this null result.
65 Data from U.S. Census Bureau, note 57.
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FIGURE 2
Colorado
Placebo Test-Expenditure0
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Note: Colorado's expenditure trajectory is highlighted in bold.
Despite the fact that actual real per capita expenditures in Colorado
have been declining since the late 1970's, the path of expenditures is
almost directly in the middle of the placebo states. The resulting
Fisher exact p-value is 0.71.
We turn now to an analysis of total own-source state and local tax
revenue in Colorado as displayed in Figures 3 and 4 below.
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FIGURE 366
Total Tax Revenue
Colorado vs. Synthetic Control
1990
Colorado - - - - - Synthetic Control
FIGURE 467
Colorado
Placebo Test-Total Tax Revenue
1970 1980 1990
Year
Note: Colorado's tax revenue trajectory is highlighted in bold.
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Colorado's own-source state and local revenue trajectory seems to
be near the estimated counterfactual outcomes for states, which is re-
flected in the lower p-value of 0.33. The evidence, however, does not
lead us to conclude that TABOR, in and of itself, had an effect on
own-source state and local revenue. It is especially noteworthy to see
that the biggest change in own-source revenue was again in the late
1970's. These results run counter to the typical story told about
TABOR.
B. California: Proposition 13
In the late 1970's, California was mired in a deep recession that was
mixed, ironically, with a decade-long period of inflation, especially in
real estate prices. This led, eventually, to a "tax revolt" and the pas-
sage of the landmark Proposition 13 in 1978,68 which limited ad
valorem property taxes and Proposition 4 (the Gann Initiative) in
1979,69 which was an expenditure limitation.70 Proposition 13 had the
following provisions:
" Property taxes limited to 1% of assessed value of property.71
* Valuations of property were rolled back to fiscal year 1976 levels
and growth in assessed value was capped at a maximum of 2%
per year.72
* Property is now only reassessed upon transfer.73
" Any further tax increases require a supermajority of votes in the
legislature.74
" Local tax increases need to be specified and require
supermajority consent of voters to pass.75
Proposition 13 and the Gann Initiative were wildly popular, with
Proposition 13, for example, garnering almost two-thirds of the popu-
lar vote.76 Looking back, it is easy to see why this tax revolt occurred.
In the years leading up to the passage of Proposition 13, California's
property taxes were tremendously high. As shown in Figure 5 below,
68 Cal. Const. art. XIII A.
69 Cal. Const. art. XIII B.
70 Because these two landmark initiatives were passed within a year of each other, it is
impossible to disentangle the effects of one or the other alone. This makes teasing out the
actual causal effects of either of these policies by itself impossible. As such, the analysis
presented in this Section is representative of the cumulative effects of both of these
policies.
71 Cal. Const. art. XIII A, § 1(a).
72 Id. § 2(a)-(b).
73 Id. § 2(a).
74 Id. § 3(a).
75 Id. § 4.
76 Jack Citrin, Introduction to Paul Richter, California and the American Tax Revolt:
Proposition 13 Five Years Later 1, 7 (Terry Schwadron ed., 1984).
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in some years California's real property taxes per capita were more
than twice the national average and in many years it was nearly so.
FIGURE 577
Property Taxes
California vs. National Average
44W
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 17 1,77 1978 1979 1980
1M =Nationl Average Calfoi I
Note: Real property taxes per capita are multiplied by lxl06 for purposes of
legibility. The national average does not include California.
Figure 5 is notable for two reasons. First, as mentioned previously,
California had very high per capita property taxes, in some years al-
most doubling the national average. California leaned heavily on
these taxes, constantly reassessing property values to squeeze as much
value as they could out of the swiftly increasing housing market. Sec-
ond, after the passage of Proposition 13, it is apparent that collected
property taxes fell to just below the national average. Proposition 13
seems to have had a tremendous effect on property taxes. Comparing
the actual time series on real property taxes per capita in California to
its synthetic counterfactual, as shown in Figure 6 below, corroborates
this effect.
77 Data from U.S. Census Bureau, note 57.
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FIGURE 678
Property Taxes
California vs. Synthetic Control
I-
S 1970 1980 1990 2000
I- California --- - - Synthetic Control
Just as Figure 5 would indicate, there is a precipitous drop in prop-
erty tax collections starting in 1979. Afterwards, the level of real per
capita property taxes stays at the same low level after the enactment
of the tax limitations, even when compared to the placebo tracks for
states in the donor pool. This is mirrored in the placebo test for prop-
erty taxes, shown in Figure 7.
78 Id.
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FIGURE 7
CALIFORNIA
PLACEBO TEST-PROPERTY TAx
wi
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Note: California's property tax trajectory is highlighted in bold.
In constructing a test, however, there is enough variation, specifi-
cally in a positive direction, such that the low trajectory shown by the
California outcome is not sufficiently atypical. The variation actually
appears quite wide. Thus, we cannot make any ultimately conclusive
statement about the effect of Proposition 13 on California's property
taxes.
It is, however, probable that there may be some issues with model-
ing property taxes. Property taxes provide "bad" matches pretest us-
ing the synthetic control method, meaning that pretest synthetic
controls are usually substantially farther away from the actual state
outcomes to which they are being compared. As such, the denomina-
tors in our statistics are quite large. It is even notable in Figure 6. In
this Article, we have used a single model to estimate own-source state
and local revenue, state and local expenditures, and other budget vari-
ables. Some of the covariates used to perform this analysis do not
perform very well in estimating state and local property taxes. The
biggest problem is related to the first and last axiom of real estate:
location, location, location. We eschew local-based models of prop-
erty taxes and our estimates suffer accordingly. For example, housing
prices could be increasing in the San Francisco Bay Area while simul-
taneously decreasing in the Rocky Mountain Plateau. This makes it
[Vol. 67:
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harder for the synthetic matching method to match on unobserved
exogenous shocks to property taxes. As such, a more theoretically
robust model of property taxation may be needed before this effect
can be explored precisely. It is also likely that California's level of
fiscal inputs is drastically larger than almost every other state in the
nation, barring possibly New York. As a result, it is likely very diffi-
cult to find an accurate statistical match for California. Within the
synthetic control method, this generally would make the results more
unreliable than others. It certainly appears that California's level of
property taxation is drastically lower than any of the other placebo
states, despite the results of the test itself.
California also sees dips in revenue and expenditure, though, again
in our placebo tests, neither of these decreases is significant. Figure 8
shows California's total tax revenue in comparison to its synthetic
control. Figure 9 shows the placebo test for total tax revenue. These
figures both mimic the change in property tax revenue, likely due to
the fact that property taxes make up a large part of the revenue col-
lected by the California state government.
FIGURE 879
Total Tax Revenue
California vs. Synthetic Control
U
4) '
/
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
California - - -- - Synthetic Control
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FIGURE 9
California
Placebo Test-Total Tax Revenue
Year
Note: California's tax revenue trajectory is highlighted in bold.
As a tertiary effect, we might expect that expenditures would fall in
California given that one of its primary sources of revenue was
capped, followed soon after by an expenditure limitation. Figures 10
and 11 show the comparison of actual tax-limitation-treated expendi-
ture and its synthetic control figure and the placebo test for donor-
pool cases respectively for expenditures in California.
The effect of Proposition 13 is much less pronounced on real per
capita state and local expenditure than it is for the revenue streams
discussed above.
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FIGURE 1080
Expenditures
California vs. Synthetic Control
Year
California - - - - - Synthetic Control
FIGURE 11"'
California
Placebo Test-Expenditure
1970 1980 1990
Year
Note: California's expenditure trajectory is highlighted in bold.
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It is notable that Proposition 13, on its face, looks like it had sub-
stantial effects despite the fact that none of the placebo tests indicate
a significant p-value. Changes in California's fiscal policy do exhibit
strong directional effects, however, that are quite indicative of success.
It is notable that California passed several high profile initiatives in a
row that both sought to limit taxes and expenditures. Because they
were passed in such rapid succession, it is impossible to actually parse
the effects of each measure. As such, we can only test their interac-
tion, even using a technique as powerful as the synthetic control
method.
It is well known that state and local governments in California have
long battled Proposition 13,82 which is further indicative of an effect.
These battles, however, highlight the government's ability to circum-
vent the measure by shifting the revenue burden onto other, nontax
sources, such as charges and fees,83 municipal assessment districts,84 or
even other tax sources, such as sales taxes.85
C. Nevada: Question 6 and Legislative Response
Nevada's case is unique in our sample as it is the only example of a
legislative measure pre-empting an initiative. It is required in Nevada
that ballot measures are voted on twice before they are permanently
in effect; the second vote is held two years after the first.8 6 This gives
the legislature a unique opportunity to respond to these ballot mea-
sures that is not afforded in other states. This is exactly the case with
Nevada's tax limitation implementation.
Nevada has had a property tax limit in place since 1936 that limited
property tax rates to 5% of assessed value.87 California's Proposition
13 had set off a wave of indignation about the level of property taxes
in particular. Nevada was one of the thirty states to consider a tax
limitation after Proposition 13. Of those thirty measures, thirteen
were successful. Voters in Nevada placed their version of Proposition
13, Question 6, up for vote in the November general election.88 Ques-
82 See McCubbins & McCubbins, note 48.
83 Kousser et al., note 17, at 351.
84 Kogan & McCubbins, note 5, at 7-10.
85 McCubbins & McCubbins, note 48, at 19-20; Jonathan Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposi-
tion 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Deci-
sions, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 183, 184 (1997).
86 Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2.
87 Id. art. X, § 2.
88 State of Nevada, Dep't of State, Constitutional Amendments to Be Voted upon in
State of Nevada at General Election, Nov. 7, 1978 (1978), available at http://www.leg.state.
nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/1978.pdf.
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tion 6 had several key provisions that were all but identical to provi-
sions in Proposition 13:
" It lowered the property tax rate to 1% of assessed value.
• Assessed valuations were rolled back to fiscal year 1976 levels
and further limited increases in these valuations to 2% per year
to account for inflation.
" Required a supermajority vote of the legislature to raise state
taxes.
" Similar provisions were applied to local taxation. Local tax in-
creases, however, would require a supermajority approval of the
voters.
This bill, like Proposition 13, is remarkable in its stringency and in
1978 it passed with 78% of the popular vote.89 In order to be placed
in the constitution, however, it needed to be voted on again in 1980. It
comes as no surprise, then, that in response to this measure, the state
legislature twice lowered the property tax rate. The first lowering was
in 1979, which lowered the effective property tax rate to 1.1% and the
last of was in 1981, which lowered the aforementioned rate again to
approximately 0.6%.90 These legislative responses were well received
and Question 6's second round of voting in 1980 saw its defeat, as it
only received 42% of the vote. 91
Thus, we have a clear story in Nevada of the legislature pre-empting
the passage of a seemingly strict initiative and reason to more exhaus-
tively analyze the compounding effects of various tax limitations
passed in the window following 1978. To examine the results of this
battle between the legislature and the voters on property taxes, see
Figure 12 below.
89 Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Background Paper 83-7, Nevada Tax Relief:
1978-1983, at 2 (1983), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us[Division/Research/Publica
tionsfBkground/BP83-07.pdf.
90 Id. at 2.
91 Id. at 3.
2014]
TAX LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 1292
Property Tax
Nevada vs. Synthetic Control
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Post implementation Nevada sees a marked drop in real state and
local property taxes per capita while its corresponding synthetic con-
trol stays roughly steady. The reduction in collected taxes is high-
lighted by two smaller drops, one that seems to correspond to each
legislative measure passed in the wake of Question 6's first vote. Af-
ter this drop, Nevada and its synthetic control increase in almost lock-
step with one another. The placebo test for property taxes in Nevada
is shown in Figure 13.
92 Data from U.S. Census Bureau, note 57.
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FIGURE 13
Nevada
Placebo Test-Property Tax
1970 1980 1990 2000
Note: Nevada's property tax trajectory is highlighted in bold.
Nevada's trajectory, although not the lowest, is marked by its con-
sistency. However, there is no associated statistical significance with
this placebo test. Other states that have higher negative gaps at the
end of the time series have much larger positive gaps right around the
implementation period. This, however, might just be due to the afore-
mentioned matching errors that would be associated with property
taxes. Looking only at the expected primary effect of Question 6 and
its subsequent pre-emptive legislative measures, there appears to be
little substantial effect. Yet, there appears to be a large effect on total
tax revenue, as demonstrated in Figures 13 and 14 below.
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FIGURE 14 9
3
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FIGURE 15
Nevada
Placebo Test-Total Tax Revenue
1970 1980 1990 2000
Note: Nevada's tax revenue trajectory is highlighted in bold.
93 Id.
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Nevada sees a drop in revenue post implementation in comparison
to its synthetic control. Unlike real state and local property taxes per
capita, though, the difference between Nevada and its synthetic con-
trol for real total own-source tax revenue per capita increases over
time. This is clearly shown in the placebo graph, where it seems to be
clear that Nevada has the largest post-treatment gap. However, this
result is not statistically significant. This is, however, likely due to the
nature of the synthetic control analysis. Nevada has, by far, the larg-
est negative post-treatment gap and the second largest post-treatment
gap in general (to Wyoming, which is positive). The two states that
have larger MSPE ratios have average pre-implementation differences
of below one, while the post-test prediction errors are at least eight
times less than the gap seen in Nevada. It is likely that the placebo
test is skewed because of these near perfect matches and that the re-
sults are an artifact of the measurement technique. As such, it is likely
that there is an effect in Nevada of the legislative pre-emption of
Question 6. This is mostly corroborated by Figure 15, which shows a
placebo test for expenditures.
FIGURE 1694
Nevada
Placebo Test-Expenditure
J -
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Note: Nevada's expenditure trajectory is highlighted in bold.
94 Id.
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Here, while Nevada still has a larger negative gap (relative to the
zero or "no change" line) than other placebo states, the effect is not
nearly as pronounced as it was in California. Statistical significance
eludes again. Instead, it appears to fall within the bounds of the distri-
bution of other placebo states and we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there was no effect on expenditure levels. Nevada also saw a tax
and expenditure limitation passed in 1979 that was targeted at state
spending levels95 followed later in 1996 by the implementation of term
limits. 96 It is difficult to disentangle these effects especially when sev-
eral policies with large fiscal implications were being passed almost
simultaneously.
Yet, Nevada's case is still worthy of exploration given the tax limita-
tion's unique path to implementation. It is, indeed, possible that the
legislature wrote a bill that provided citizens with property tax relief
while simultaneously providing relaxed limitations in keeping with
legislative incentives. It is also possible that the political environment
became more conducive to the implementation of these measures.
Further, there is a possibility that Nevada's cavalcade of policy inter-
actions around this time period was more effective at limiting legisla-
tive budget action than any one measure was by itself. Despite our
nonsignificant findings, further study is warranted.
D. Idaho: The 1% Solution
Like Nevada, Idaho voters passed a direct statutory initiative identi-
cal to California's Proposition 13 in November of 1978. 97 This left the
legislature free to manipulate and amend the initiative, which they did
numerous times in the following years. 98 To analyze the primary ef-
fects of this property tax limitation, see Figure 16, which shows Idaho
property taxes and its synthetic control.
95 Nevada Legislative Council Bureau, note 89, at 5-6.
96 Elections Division, State of Nevada, Ballot Questions 1996, Question No. 9 (1996),
available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/1996
.pdf.
97 Idaho St. Tax Comm'n, Property Tax Budget Limitations and 1% Initiatives
1978-Present 1 (1998), available at http://tax.idaho.gov/pubs/EPB00107_01-01-1998.pdf.
98 Id. at 1-3.
[Vol. 67:
WHEN ARE TAX LIMITATIONS EFFECTIVE
FIGURE 17 99
Property Tax
Idaho vs. Synthetic Control
19'70 19180 190
r Idaho . - - - Synthetic Control 1
There appears to be an effect on property tax collections shortly
after the implementation of this initiative. Idaho's real state and local
property taxes per capita, however, increase faster than its synthetic
counterfactual, eventually reaching a point where the two intersect.
However, this effect is not significant, as shown in Figure 17, where
Idaho's trajectory lies almost directly in the middle of the other pla-
cebo trajectories. There is very little reason to believe that there was
any direct effect on property taxes here.
99 Data from U.S. Census Bureau, note 57.
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FIGURE 18
Idaho
Placebo Test-Property Tax
1970 1980 1990
Year
Note: Idaho's property tax trajectory is highlighted in bold.
2000
Unsurprisingly, total tax revenue follows suit, as shown in Figure 18.
The figure shows a similar dip, although not seemingly as large. Total
tax revenue then remains under its synthetic control for the rest of the
time series, much like property taxes did. It is noteworthy that Idaho
provides an almost perfect pre-implementation match, with the aver-
age difference between Idaho and its synthetic control being 0.01.
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FIGURE 19
Total Tax Revenue
Idaho vs. Synthetic Control
1970 1980 1990
Year
Idaho - - - - Synthetic Control
This effect is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.05. Figure
19 provides the placebo test figure for total tax revenue in Idaho.
FIGURE 20100
Idaho
Placebo Test-Total Tax Revenue
Year
Note: Idaho's tax revenue trajectory is highlighted in bold.
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When looking at Figure 19, it is difficult to see why this effect is
statistically significant, as it appears, like property taxes before it, to
lie directly in the middle of the placebo distribution. It appears, how-
ever, that this result is driven almost entirely by the near perfect pre-
implementation match. Because the match is so close, it drives up the
MSPE ratio relative to the placebo states, causing the effect to be very
pronounced despite how unpronounced the effect itself seems. This is
the same effect that seemed to drive Nevada away from significance.
Instead, this time, despite the significance attached to this result, there
is little reason to believe that there was any substantial effect here.
IV. CONCLUSION
We theorized that requiring voter approval of tax impositions by
the legislature would not change government fiscal behavior. Our
synthetic case-control analysis confirms this theory. The behavior of
the legislature rarely changes following the implementation of tax lim-
itations. Likewise, government spending does not decrease, nor is
debt reduced. This corroborates many recent stories about the nature
of tax expenditure limitations in general: Tax expenditure limitations
do not constrain government taxes or spending. Additionally, we also
find evidence that even "success stories" such as Colorado's TABOR,
do not demonstrate any of the notable effects that were attributed to
them.
This work also has broader implications regarding the construction
of effective governmental institutions. The often-conflicting interests
that underpin the relationship between voters and their agents render
the initiative process a weak institution. As voters lack the necessary
means of enforcement, it is required that legislatures enforce the pro-
visions in their stead. When legislatures are hostile to the provisions
in a ballot measure, it is unlikely to be implemented as was intended
by the voters. This is especially true in fiscal matters, whereby legisla-
tures are incentivized to maintain or exceed current levels of taxes and
expenditures.
